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Abstract 
Purpose: Given their exposure to diverse institutional settings, decision making in 
multinational enterprises (MNE) is marked by inconsistencies and conflict. Within the 
comparative institutional analysis (CIA) literature, such inconsistencies are seen as a 
source of experimentation or innovation. By contrast, in the international business 
(IB) literature, institutions are primarily understood as constraints on MNE activity.  
The latter focuses on ‘institutional effects’ taking institutions as stable and 
determining of social agency. As a way of addressing this limitation, we aim to 
understand the conditions that enable actors to engage in strategic action despite 
institutional pressures towards statis.  
 
Methods: The research draws on systematic comparative case studies of two large 
MNEs in the chemical industry, headquartered in Germany and the UK, and operating 
in Italy, Germany, and Poland. It focuses on one example of agency, subsidiary efforts 
to change product formulations that are successfully developed by the headquarters.  
 
Results: We demonstrate that agency within MNEs is influenced by a fit between 
MNE coordination structures shaped by home country institutions and host country 
institutions’ demands for flexibility or collaboration.  
 
Conclusion: Institutional incompatibilities between home and host contexts are 
unlikely to trigger actors’ reflective capacity to change if the actors cannot draw on 
supportive coordination structures in the MNE. This is not just an ‘institutional 
distance’ argument as is commonly understood in IB. It is related to whether local 
institutions support the subsidiary to take advantage of specific opportunities 
conditioned by the home country institutions. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: embedded agency, host institutions, institutional incompatibility, MNE 
coordination structures 
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Introduction 
Decision making in MNEs is marked by inconsistencies and conflict owing to their 
exposure to diverse institutional settings. Although institutions are primarily 
understood as constraints on MNE activity, inconsistencies between them can be a 
source of experimentation or innovation. Inspired by this theoretical insight, we aim 
to understand the conditions that enable actors to engage in strategic action despite 
institutional pressures towards statis. We emphasize the enabling effects of 
institutions and demonstrate the importance of a fit between MNE coordination 
structures shaped by home country institutions and host country institutions’ demand 
for flexibility or collaboration in fostering agency.  
 Institutional theory has provided a rich theoretical foundation in MNE 
research (e.g. Dacin et al. 2002; Djelic and Quack 2003). However, most IB scholars 
have adopted a narrow view of institutions, drawing predominantly on the 
institutional economics understanding of institutions as ‘rules of the game’ (North 
1990). They study institutions in terms of how diverse regulatory rules and legal 
norms affect the performance of MNEs (Brouthers 2002) or expose firms to 
politically-related hazards (Delios and Henisz 2000). Accordingly, institutions are 
understood as constraints on MNE activity, through transaction costs, differing 
resource environments or institutional distance. In this view, actors are understood as 
agents for legitimizing organizations to enhance the organization’s likelihood of 
survival (Jackson and Deeg 2008). However, this view of institutions and their 
relationship to the agency of individual actors in the MNE is rather constrained. 
Achieving and maintaining legitimacy are difficult for MNEs given their operation in 
multiple, fragmented, often conflicting institutional environments (Kostova et al. 
2008). Ambiguity created by such diversity can create room for strategic responses to 
institutions that involve creative reinterpretation and redeployment of resources for 
new purposes (Jackson 2005). In other words, the exposure to multiple institutional 
environments can trigger innovative change. Institutional change can result as actors 
use contradictions to reflect on the limits of existing institutional arrangements and to 
inspire ideas for new ones (Hardy and Maguire 2008). The question of how actors are 
enabled to engage in institutional work remains largely unanswered (Battilana and 
D’Aunno 2009). Consequently, we aim to address how institutionally-embedded 
actors are enabled to instigate change. 
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 Given our discontent with the rather constrained view of institutions in the IB 
field, we turn our attention to comparative institutional analysis (CIA). Rather than 
adopting a variable-based approach to viewing institutional diversity, CIA scholars 
study institutions as interactively constituted, recognizing the social interactions 
among different institutional dimensions (Jackson and Deeg 2008). As firms’ 
interactions are shaped by various institutions outside the firm, they may develop 
different internal capabilities and foundations for competitive advantage across 
countries (Hall and Soskice 2001; Whitley 2007). Similar to the researchers in the 
entrepreneurship literature (e.g. Bruton and Ahlstrom 2003), CIA scholars see 
institutions as both enabling and constraining actors. 
 More recently, CIA scholars have been shedding light on how institutions 
originate and evolve by introducing more agency into the creation and change of 
institutions (e.g. Crouch 2005; Hancké and Goyer 2005; Streeck and Thelen 2005). 
They seek to explain how actors experiment with novel uses and combinations of 
institutions to solve coordination problems or develop specific capabilities. In 
addition to reinterpreting and reforming existing institutions, actors are also seen as 
mobilizing resources to defect (i.e. ignore) institutions (Hall and Thelen 2009). 
Misalignments between institutionalized rules and situational demands for resources 
can create room for actors to engage in innovative changes (Crouch 2005). Seo and 
Creed (2002) refer to this as tensions within and between social systems that 
transform the embedded social actors into the change agents of established 
institutions.  
 While we believe that these new developments in CIA have added important 
new perspectives for the study of MNEs, in this study, we contribute further by 
bringing a new understanding to the idea of actor agency within MNEs that operate in 
diverse, potentially conflicting, institutional environments, i.e. the motivation and 
ability of actors, both individual (subsidiary managers) and collective (subsidiaries as 
a whole), to pursue and effect change where they can draw on supportive coordination 
structures in MNEs. Specifically, in our study, we examined the different forms of 
agency displayed by subsidiaries in the area of product development where there were 
different demands from home institutions, manifested in MNE structures, and host 
country institutions.  
 First, we distinguish between different forms of agency. We then offer a new 
perspective on how different types of agency emerge and what their relationship with 
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different institutional contexts is. By contrast to the IB literature, we show that 
institutions do not just constrain but also enable agency, and that active agency can, in 
turn, transform institutional arrangements (Hollingsworth 2003)1. Moreover, by 
contrast to the CIA literature, the study considers not just the compatibility of 
institutions between home and host countries, but also explores the role of MNE 
coordination structures in shaping the types of agency that emerge. 
 
Theoretical Background 
Agency and Institutions within IB 
The IB literature acknowledges the role of institutions in firm strategy and 
performance across nations. The ‘institution-based view of strategy’ in IB research 
(Peng 2002, 2003) provides crucial explanations for why transaction costs arise, why 
resources are developed in a particular way and how organizations evolve. Institutions 
are understood as regulatory rules and legal norms that affect location decisions 
(Meyer and Nguyen 2005), mode-of-entry decisions and performance (Cuervo-
Cazurra and Genc 2008; Dikova and van Witteloostuijn 2007; Brouthers 2002), and 
firm strategies (e.g. Zhao 2006). The success of MNE strategies such as 
agglomeration or export of practices depends on the specific types of national 
institution, such as the degree of market development (Lee and Beamish 1995) or 
distance from the host country (Ghemawat 2001). Comparative advantage is attained 
through a fit of strategy to host institutional context. For example, Meyer (2001) 
demonstrates that MNEs entering transition economies adapt their strategies to the 
local institutions in order to reduce exposure to highly imperfect markets.  
 IB scholars investigate single institutional effects ceteris paribus (Jackson and 
Deeg 2008). They adopt a variable-based approach to institutional diversity along 
discrete parameters at a high level of aggregation. This approach overlooks the 
potential for interactions among different institutional features of countries that lead to 
differences in kind. Rather, it aims to capture difference in terms of degree of 
institutional distance (Jackson and Deeg 2008). Although some IB literature and 
works on entrepreneurship in international settings (e.g. Bruton and Ahlstrom 2003) 
recognize that institutions do not fully determine action (e.g. Henisz and Zelner 2005), 
the view of institutions, by the very nature of its definition as ‘the humanly devised 
constraints that structure human interaction’ (North 1990: 3), remains rather focused 
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on how institutions constrain strategic choice (e.g. Peng et al. 2009). Most existing 
literature has emphasized the resources and capabilities of the entering firm (Peng 
2001), and its need to minimize transaction costs (Buckley and Casson 1976; Hill et 
al. 1990). For instance, investments might be discouraged into institutionally distant 
countries (e.g. Treviňo and Mixon 2004; Delios and Beamish 1999), in particular in 
markets in which policy uncertainty is high (Henisz and Delios 2001). The larger the 
institutional distance, the more difficult it becomes for the MNE to establish 
legitimacy in the host country and to transfer knowledge to foreign subsidiaries. The 
distance between home and host institutional contexts implies costs for coordinating 
activities cross-nationally. Given that the transaction costs of engaging in these 
markets are relatively higher, MNEs have to devise strategies to overcome these 
constraints (Peng 2008). In attempting to reduce transaction costs, it is observed that 
companies must choose between a hierarchy and a market mode of organizing, that is 
they are motivated by the internalization incentives related to control (e.g. Meyer 
2001). For example, MNEs might establish a joint venture to access resources held by 
local firms to help counteract idiosyncrasies of a weak institutional context (Delios 
and Beamish 1999; Meyer et al. 2009). This conceptualization of strategic choice does 
not consider how institutions shape the capabilities of organizations to pursue 
different strategies. Overall, firms are seen largely as unitary, rational, and self-
interested actors with stable preferences, constrained by institutional rules and norms. 
We address this limitation in the mainstream IB literature by demonstrating the 
enabling effect of institutions where host institutional demands are met by MNE 
structures that are shaped by home country institutions.  
 
Agency and Institutions within CIA 
CIA has a long tradition in sociology and political science, and has contributed to the 
diversity in employment systems (Streeck 1992), and corporate governance (Aguilera 
and Jackson 2003). In CIA, institutions are understood as systemically interdependent 
configurations resulting in internal cohesion, i.e. as types that generate a particular 
systemic logic of economic action and competitive advantages related to 
complementarities among those institutions (Jackson and Deeg 2008). The emphasis 
is on how and why institutions differ across countries, often starting from a thick 
description of institutions (see Redding 2005) and a holistic analysis of institutions 
within a specific national ‘case’. Rather than treating institutional diversity in terms of 
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‘distance’, the CIA approach has developed a theory of comparative institutional 
advantage in which different institutional settings have distinct strengths and 
weaknesses for different kinds of economic activity. Institutions are seen by CIA 
scholars not only as constraints but also as resources for solving key problems of 
economic coordination through non-economic, value-rational sets of commitments 
(Jackson and Deeg 2008). Institutions shape financial and labour systems that are 
collectively available to firms, as well as market and non-market forms of 
coordination (Whitley 1999). This leads to diverse organizational capabilities. The 
assumption is that each firm is a coalition among different types of investors, 
employees and managers whose interactions are shaped by various institutions outside 
the firm. Institutional diversity affects the ability of MNEs to adapt their strategy to 
host country institutions (Whitley 2007). In spite of the same degree of ‘institutional 
distance’, the particular types of home country institutions can lead to different 
strategic adaptations on the part of MNEs (e.g. Edwards and Ferner 2002; Saka 2004). 
Furthermore, MNE strategies may be shaped by arbitrage between different 
institutional systems (e.g. Börch 2007). The embeddedness of MNEs in their home 
country institutions has a significant influence on the development of distinctive 
competences. For instance, firms in countries with a strong capacity for incremental 
innovation and diversified quality production, such as Germany, might be more likely 
to retain manufacturing in their home country than firms in liberal market economies 
(e.g. Geppert et al. 2003; Williams and Geppert 2011). The CIA approach to MNE 
strategy underscores institutional complementarities, i.e. the functional interactions 
between institutions in a particular case rather than single institutional variables. By 
contrast to the IB literature, CIA sees competitive advantage not so much as a fit of 
strategy to an institutional context but in terms of institutionally shaped capabilities 
for different strategies and types of coordination.  
 Going further, neo-institutional studies have documented the ability of actors, 
in particular those with some key strategic resources or other forms of power, to have 
significant impacts on the evolution of institutions and fields (Greenwood et al. 2002), 
including both institutional transformation (radical change) and deinstitutionalization 
(gradual change). Lawrence and Suddaby (2006, p. 224) argue that new institutions 
can be created through complementing or directly challenging existing institutions.  
 Based on these views, one can argue that agency is not the result of a degree of 
adaptation to a given institutional environment, but a response to interactions among 
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different institutional features of countries. CIA goes on to show that misalignments 
between institutionalized rules and situational demands are the space in which actors’ 
choices may lead to innovative changes (Crouch 2005; Streeck and Thelen 2005). 
However, we believe that the condition of heterogeneity in institutional settings (i.e. 
contradictions between home and host country expectations) cannot adequately 
account for the variation in agency across firms that are embedded in different 
institutional contexts. We contribute to the CIA literature by demonstrating the 
importance of institutionally-shaped coordination structures—a source of resource 
that can enable or constrain action—that meet the institutional demands of host 
contexts in eliciting agency within MNEs.   
 In this paper, we define agency as the motivation and creativity that drive 
actors to break away from institutional constraints and established patterns of 
behaviour (Dorado 2005). Seo and Creed (2002) argue, for example, that individuals 
become more intentional and self-conscious when faced with institutional practices 
that contradict or conflict with each other. In turn, raised consciousness enables 
individuals to change or challenge institutional constraints. We identify different 
forms of agency along Emirbayer and Mische’s (1998) conceptualization2: actors’ 
orientation i) to ‘project’ (i.e. to engage in imaginative generation of possible future 
trajectories of action, and ii) to ‘iterate’ (i.e. to rely on the past) and to ‘practically-
evaluate’ (i.e. to respond to the demands of the present by making practical judgments 
among alternative trajectories of action). Iterative and practical-evaluative agency, 
given their orientations to the past and present, are less likely than projective agency 
to promote action that transforms or challenges institutions. Hence, we label these 
forms of agency as ‘passive’. By contrast, projective agency, given its orientation to 
the future, may explain actors’ efforts to breakaway from social constraints (Battilana 
and D’Aunno 2009). Hence, we label this form of agency as ‘active’.  
 
Methods 
The research drew on systematic comparative case studies of two large MNEs in the 
chemical industry, headquartered in Germany and the UK, and operating in Italy, 
Germany, and Poland. It aimed to investigate the processes where agency was 
triggered within a given institutional context and MNE coordination structure. It 
 9  
focused on one example of agency: subsidiary efforts to change product formulations 
that were successfully developed by the headquarters (HQ).  
We drew on Richard Whitley’s well-known national business systems (NBS) 
typologies to classify our companies. According to Whitley (1999, p. 60), dominant 
forms of governance such as skills development and control, trust and authority, 
financial systems, and the role of the state in a given nation, what Hollingsworth 
(2003) calls institutional sectors, are seen as shaping different forms of business 
systems. Managerial coordination and work organization within the firm reflect the 
institutional context in which they are embedded. In line with our conceptual interests, 
we selected two MNEs with distinctive home institutional contexts, one originating 
from a compartmentalized form of governance, the UK, and another from a 
collaborative form of governance, Germany (see Whitley 1999). Compartmentalized 
national business systems are defined by arm’s length and typically adversarial 
employment relations, with extensive unilateral control by management and strong 
management-worker separation. Consequently, the influence of employee interests on 
decision-making is low. There is emphasis on the reduction of agency costs through 
heavy reliance on formal mechanisms to order commercial relationships. There is also 
strong separation of strategic and operational management and the exercise of control 
via financial mechanisms. By contrast, collaborative national business systems 
encourage and support cooperation between collective actors. Key labour market 
institutions of collective bargaining, co-determination and initial vocational training 
call for HRM by a pluralistic style. Employees are encouraged to participate in 
management decisions through works councils and are backed by extensive 
legislation. Managers rely on firm-specific relationships, i.e. commitment, to exercise 
control (Aguilera and Jackson 2003).  
Subsidiaries were selected on the basis of their differences in institutional 
demands from home country-shaped MNE structures. The Polish subsidiary is 
embedded in a mixture of state-organized and compartmentalized national business 
system where the state continues to dominate economic development and guides firm 
behaviour although its influence is declining (Meardi et al. 2009). Similar to other 
Central Eastern European countries, collaboration within sectors is reduced and 
horizontal linkages between actors across sectors and employer-employee 
interdependence are limited by strong ties of vertical dependence (Czaban et al. 
2003). Trade unions are politicized, employer associations are weak, and there is 
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single-channel employee representation (Meardi et al. 2009). By contrast, the Italian 
subsidiary is embedded in a coordinated industrial district (see e.g. Whitley 1999). It 
is located in Lombardy, which is a designated chemical district constituting one of the 
20 regions of the European Chemical Regions Network (ECRN). In comparison to the 
compartmentalized system of the UK, there is greater degree of alliance in such 
districts, with extensive commitment between business partners, significant 
coordination of activities through alliances, and greater employer-employee 
interdependence (Whitley 2007).   
As can be seen in table 1, the differences in institutional demands between the 
international mode of coordination in the UK home and those of the German host 
context (commonly referred to in CIA as polar national cases), and the global mode of 
coordination in the German home and those of the Polish host context, were greater 
than those between the structure in the UK and institutional demands of Poland and 
between the structure in Germany and institutional demands of Italy. In the UK and 
Poland, there is limited coordination and long-term commitment to business partners 
is more difficult to develop. Given the strong separation of strategic and operational 
management in these two countries, we label the host country demand as one for 
operational flexibility. In Germany and Italy, the type of business system is 
collaborative, and the host country demand is one of collaboration. We capture home 
country institutions in their manifestation in MNE coordination structures, for these 
structures are shaped by home country institutions. Greater levels of authoritative 
integration of innovative activities occur in societies where there are stronger 
constraints on opportunistic behaviour. Such integration can be achieved either 
through state commitment to particular innovation goals and/or through inter-firm 
alliances and business groups as found in CMEs (Whitley 2007, p. 62). Sharing 
knowledge and collaborating in the development of innovations is easier and less 
risky in CMEs than in more arm’s length ones such as LMEs (ibid.). Hence, there 
would be a greater tendency for German firms to adopt an integrated network model 
emphasizing collaboration, and for UK firms to adopt an international model 
emphasizing financial rather than operational controls by HQ.  
We identified subsidiaries’ affiliation with a particular MNE coordination 
structure, which was either the international or the combination of integrated network 
and global coordination structure along two dimensions: i) the extent to which 
capabilities and decision-making were decentralized, and ii) the extent to which there 
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was high interdependency of work between the subsidiaries and HQ (Bartlett and 
Ghoshal 1989; Harzing 1999). They were based, initially, on our interviews with 
strategic managers at the British and German MNEs and MNE documents on the 
extent to which capabilities such as R&D were decentralized to various global 
operations. In the course of data collection, we sought further evidence of this 
categorization in subsequent interviews at HQ and subsidiaries. For instance, the 
British MNE’s approach to developing subsidiary capability was much more 
centralized than that of the German MNE operating in Western Europe. The VP of 
marketing of the British MNE argued that “ours would still be seen as a command and 
control structure”. As regards the interdependency of work, knowledge was developed 
at the centre and subsequently transferred to overseas units.  
Table 1 provides an overview of the sampled cases. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
In the late 1990s, the British MNE, facing pressure to maximize returns on a 
single project, adopted an international strategy. This shift brought with it 
formalization, particularly in product development, where subsidiaries were primarily 
regarded as appendages to a central domestic corporation. Similarly, given 
competitive pressures to improve profitability in mid-1990, the German MNE adopted 
a mix of transnational (among Western European (WE) sites) and global strategy 
(among Central and Eastern European (CEE) sites) to operating outside the domestic 
market. In other words, there was an emphasis on specialized operations and 
interdependent relations among WE operations. Whereas, the CEE operations were 
managed centrally by the Austrian CEE HQ, and granted less autonomy than WE 
operations. For instance, they were not involved in new product development.   
 
Data Collection 
The field study employed 35 open-ended and semi-structured interviews conducted 
between March 2002 and May 2003 with executives overseeing international 
operations in marketing, manufacturing, HR and R&D at the parent companies and 
their counterparts at the subsidiaries, as well as factory visits and document analyses. 
Information was sought on the types of practices that were transferred, resources that 
were made available by the parent company, the role of the parent company in 
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subsidiary’s operations, the procedures that were adopted by the parent company for 
the subsidiary team’s participation in the development and launch of an innovative 
product, and the way the product was modified to meet the preferences of the given 
host market.  
In line with the conceptualization of agency by Emirbayer and Mische (1998), 
we categorized agency as ‘active’ or ‘passive’ (defined theoretically on page 9) in the 
following manner. Active agency occurred when subsidiaries displayed new patterns 
of thinking about business objectives in anticipation of future needs (Sadler-Smith et 
al. 2001). Actors’ efforts were directed at projection that promoted the transformation 
of the institutional arrangement of markets. An example of active agency is the 
introduction of a new product idea to increase market share or to fight local 
competition that leads to a shift in industry trends in a given host market. Passive 
agency was characterized by an actor’s inclination to iterate or apply transferred 
practices (Sadler-Smith et al. 2001). These did not involve any fundamental changes 
to the institutional arrangements of markets. An example of passive agency is the 
adaptation of raw materials in product formulations to the host context that does not 
necessarily lead to transformation in market structure.  
We employed Mill’s method of systematically comparing cases with different 
types of agency. CIA studies often rely on comparisons of how firms perform or 
adjust to similar pressures in two or more national ‘cases’ (e.g. Wever 1995). Mill’s 
method is suitable for configurational theory (where institutions are viewed as 
interdependent configurations rather than in isolation) since it explicitly 
conceptualizes cases as combinations of attributes. In other words, different causal 
conditions are understood in relation to one another and in terms of the total picture 
that they constitute. Similarities and differences across the cases are collated in a 
single, coherent framework. Each unique configuration of causal attributes becomes a 
‘whole’ that is treated as being distinctive from every other configuration. The method 
does not ask about the independent effect of a variable on the likelihood of a 
particular form of agency. Rather, it considers configurations of values on the 
independent variables as cases. The analysis aims to isolate which cases display active 
agency. Those cases represent the conjunction of causal attributes that produce active 
agency (George and Bennett 2005).  
Initially, detailed case studies were conducted that captured contextualities in 
agency such as the mode of control that the MNEs exercised on their subsidiaries. 
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This first step determined the main conditions to a given outcome within each 
particular case. This was followed by a comparison across cases conducted 
systematically to allow for theoretical generalization. This second step determined 
necessary and unnecessary conditions3 associated with the outcome. Method of 
agreement and method of difference were adopted for comparing cases with different 
types of agency (Mill 1974). Initially, an instance of active agency (Polish subsidiary 
of British MNE) was compared with another instance of active agency (Italian 
subsidiary of German MNE) to identify similar bundles of conditions associated with 
a similar outcome (method of agreement). This analysis revealed a ‘fit between MNE 
coordination structure and host country demand for operational flexibility or 
collaboration’ as a common condition. This was followed by a method of difference 
where cases with dissimilar types of agency were compared. In other words, an 
instance of active agency (Polish subsidiary of British MNE) was compared with an 
instance of passive agency (Polish subsidiary of German MNE) to identify ‘bundles of 
conditions’, i.e. a misfit between MNE coordination structure and local host demands, 
mode of entry into host country, and mode of control that explained for the variation. 
A combination of the two methods eliminated ‘mode of entry’ and ‘mode of control’ 
as necessary conditions and revealed the mis/fit between ‘host context demand’ and 
‘MNE coordination structure’ as influencing different types of agency. 
Open and axial forms of coding were used to identify categories and related 
sub-categories respectively for a given type of agency (Strauss and Corbin 1998): for 
instance, the responses to the question on ‘the way the product was modified by the 
subsidiary to meet the preferences of the given host market’ focused on knowledge 
transfer. By the same token, the question on ‘the resources that were made available 
by the parent company’ revealed information on the organizational capabilities of 
subsidiaries (Whitley 2007, p. 147). As other respondents acknowledged these, 
theoretical saturation was reached and ‘knowledge transfer’ and ‘subsidiary 
capability’ were included as categories in the analysis. Sub-categories were identified 
on the basis of the categories’ properties and dimensions such as the ‘direction of 
knowledge transfer’. To verify the explanatory power of the codes, axial coding was 
carried out to relate sub-categories or conditions to the type of agency outcome (see 
the appendix for an illustrative list of codes and their definitions as well as the 
statements denoting how these are related). 
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The reliability of the findings was enhanced by making explicit the procedures 
that were followed for data collection. These procedures included matters of interview 
protocol, tape recordings of interviews, and feedback on transcriptions from 
participants. Within case companies, interview data from a particular work group, 
such as R&D, were checked against responses from another group, such as marketing, 
to validate findings. Similarly, subsidiary and parent company members’ accounts 
were cross-checked against each other. Protocols incorporating schedules of company 
visits and members to be interviewed were developed. Interview transcriptions were 
scanned to identify patterns of active and passive agency at subsidiaries, as well as the 
‘bundles of conditions’ that accounted for the variation in types of agency.  
 
Findings  
Our findings indicate that heterogeneity of institutional settings per se is not sufficient 
to promote active agency. Institutional incompatibilities are unlikely to trigger actors’ 
reflective capacity to redefine existing institutional arrangements if these hinge on 
unsupportive coordination structures. For instance, the German subsidiary of the 
British MNE displayed passive agency despite differences between home and host 
institutional contexts, because its international coordination structure did not support 
multiplex inter-firm networks, a high degree of internal participation, or the reliance 
on firm-specific relationships in Germany (Aguilera and Jackson 2003). Similarly, in 
spite of an institutional incompatibility between the German MNE and the Polish 
subsidiary, the Polish operation also displayed passive agency. The subsidiary was 
only a ‘peripheral participant’ within the German MNE network structure (Clark and 
Geppert 2006), and its functional and operational integration within the MNE group 
was weak.  By contrast, we found that where there was a fit between MNE structures 
embedded in home institutional contexts and host context demands, there was active 
agency where the MNE coordination structure served as a means of mobilizing 
resources. These findings are discussed in more detail below. Table 2 provides an 
overview of the contextual influences on types of agency across the subsidiaries of 
two MNEs.  
   
Insert Table 2 about here 
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Passive Agency at the British MNE’s German Subsidiary 
In the German subsidiary, there was passive agency in the form of ‘iteration and 
application’ of product formulations (i.e. the introduction of new techniques without 
major change to behaviour) rather than ‘projection’ or planned new uses of 
knowledge for the future. This was related to a misfit between an international mode 
of coordination shaped by a compartmentalized national business system and host 
demand for collaboration.  
In spite of its local responsiveness to market differences in terms of packaging 
and colour range, the British MNE mainly exported product ideas and recipes to its 
European subsidiaries (i.e. knowledge flowed from the parent to subsidiaries): 
“Knowledge is developed at the centre and exported to overseas units” (strategic 
research manager, British MNE). Subsidiaries were responsible for minor changes to 
the product.  
For local development of products, usually that is best done very close to 
the customer in a local country, you know, you are putting few extra 
colours on to the colour range or just making a small change to a 
particular product…We do have a discipline, a template, an operating 
framework that says what is decided where, which decisions are to be 
taken locally, regionally, internationally and what things you need to tell 
people (research and innovation director, British MNE). 
 
The rules, procedures and policies for new product development were standardized 
and formalized. The MNE supported the development of its German subsidiary’s 
innovative capability by transferring engineering and manufacturing process 
improvement know-how labelled as the ‘paint plant of the future’, as well as 
technology needed to adapt product formulations developed at HQ to the raw 
materials in Germany. However, despite the shift towards a more centralized mode of 
coordination in the late 1990s, there was no emphasis on expatriate management or 
international training to acculturate subsidiary members at the MNE. The emphasis 
was on exporting product ideas and improvements in manufacturing accuracy. 
With the [X brand], what we did is that we exported it from the UK. So 
they [the German subsidiary] took the same range as the UK, and then 
gradually over a period of time, we formulated a match using their raw 
materials…They sorted their factory out in terms of their quality. So 
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they are now making it for themselves as well as for Czech and 
Hungary. (general manager R&D Europe) 
 
Product ideas transferred from HQ tended to meet resistance at the German subsidiary 
owing to a pre-existing culture established prior to its acquisition by the British MNE 
in 1998.  
Four years ago, when I discussed this with Germany and the UK, they 
[Germany] asked ‘why do you want to launch this when other paints 
cover well, better than those of the competitors?’ (observed by the 
marketing director at the Polish subsidiary). 
 
“Special practices such as quality management systems in the UK [at British Chem] 
are spread internationally to improve efficiency and quality. The knowledge that is 
being transferred from HQ has not changed anything fundamentally” (senior product 
manager at the German site). There was limited use of data for continuous 
improvement, lack of discipline and urgency in shop-floor activities. This was, in 
particular, conspicuous in the filling area. Its organizational capability was 
characterized by the managing director as “cumbersome processes in introducing new 
products, hierarchical decision-making processes with long lines of communication, 
cumbersome sign-off processes, [emphasis on] departmental interdependencies rather 
than an entrepreneurial style, and an ‘it is not my problem’ mindset” (managing 
director at the German subsidiary).   
The subsidiary assumed a reactive orientation to improving its processes in 
continuous steps to meet HQ standards.  
Because people used to be independent for 40 years in their history and 
all of a sudden there comes a parent company, puts a foot on us and says 
‘we will guide you through some of our standards. We have got 
company standards that you have to follow’, people see that sometimes 
as pain. (managing director at the German subsidiary)    
 
The German subsidiary adhered to old ways of working and pragmatically adapted its 
products to the German market rather than reoriented its strategic approach. 
 
Active Agency at the British MNE’s Polish Subsidiary 
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In the Polish subsidiary, actors emphasized experimentation and risk taking. They 
displayed projective agency by anticipating future market needs. This was associated 
with a fit between an international mode of coordination shaped by a 
compartmentalized national business system and host demand for operational 
flexibility. 
 As in the former case, rules and procedures for new product development were 
standardized and formalized, and product recipes and manufacturing-related 
knowledge were exported from the HQ to Poland. “All recipes are owned, in fact, by 
the UK. So if we want to make changes to the recipes, those need to be approved by 
the UK” (marketing director at the Polish subsidiary). This was related to time and 
resource constraints such as the size of the R&D department at the Polish site (head of 
research lab at the Polish subsidiary). If the Polish site had an idea for a new product, 
its recipe could be prepared in Poland, the test results discussed with the parent 
company, and the product sold under the international brand name. However, despite 
the importation of product ideas from HQ, the Polish site displayed an active 
orientation to changing templates for behaviour by, for instance, introducing new 
products to the market that shifted the industry trend.  
In terms of the sophistication in the Polish market now…there was no 
really major paint company there, the paint companies have gone in and 
started to grow the market from a value point of view, getting them into 
colour, bringing innovation into the marketplace...As a market, it has 
proved really responsive to the innovation…They are responding much 
more readily than say the Germans did, who have perhaps been stuck in 
their way. (general manager R&D Europe)    
 
New product development was discussed on a regular basis with the HQ. Although 
the subsidiary was perceived as the least technologically advanced of all players in 
Poland, and had the smallest and the least technically equipped R&D lab, it had 
responsibility over low-volume, highly profitable, and value-added brands during the 
preliminary phase of the launch on the market (marketing director at the Polish 
subsidiary). There was heavy emphasis on experimentation at the site, which was also 
evident in the site’s receptivity to new ideas from HQ. “They [the Polish subsidiary] 
are hungry for ideas. This is not to say they do not have good ideas of their own, but 
they are hungry” (general manager for R&D Europe). By contrast to the former case 
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and despite its similarity in ownership structure, the Polish site engaged in proactive 
search for ideas in the British MNE’s pool of expertise and introduced these to the 
market. In 1998, it introduced colours in the market when the paint industry was 
moving in the direction of the tinting business.  
About four years ago, we were looking at different products to launch 
which would be innovative, different and better than what the 
competition has got. There were no products…the market at that point in 
time seemed to be following the way of developing the tinting 
business…Looking at the UK market, there were suggestions that 
launching colours would not be a bad idea, because it works in the UK. 
However, we are afraid of advices of doing something because it works 
in the UK. So we did not really know which would be the preferred 
route. (marketing director at the Polish subsidiary) 
 
When market results pointed to important benefits to consumers, the site was 
encouraged to launch colours, and subsequently raised its rank to a second position in 
the marketplace.  
 
Active Agency at the German MNE’s Italian Subsidiary 
In the Italian subsidiary, actors took strategic action to transform the market (i.e. 
assumed projective agency). This was related to a fit between an integrated network 
mode of coordination shaped by a collaborative national business system and host 
demand for collaboration,.  
 The Italian subsidiary, which had been operating as a greenfield site since 
1935, participated in the strong, tightly-knit network of Euro-team meetings of the 
MNE. This network encouraged both the importing and exporting of knowledge on 
product ideas between HQ and the subsidiary (i.e. knowledge flowed both ways 
between the parent and the subsidiary). It focused on building a strong corporate 
culture, acculturating members of the network through international management 
training and secondment. Although there was not a transfer of manufacturing 
excellence techniques to the Italian site, HQ-developed product recipes were 
introduced for local adaptation. The subsidiary was able to change not only fragrances 
and colourants, but also the viscosity levels of products, upon lengthy negotiations 
with HQ. For instance, it re-launched a product formula to replace the bio-degradable 
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old raw material. Initial studies were carried out in Germany. The process was then 
adapted in Italy, France, and Spain.  
We worked 10 years ago to re-launch formula with a new raw material. 
The reason was the bio-degradability of the old raw material. So an 
international team was established. We were part of this team. First, 
studies were done in Germany. We then worked to adapt the process in 
Italy, France and Spain…High viscosity was very important for Italy, 
but not so important for other countries. So we had to find a way to 
increase the viscosity of the product having the same level of cost as in 
other countries. We followed a very precise process with specific 
parameters. The results were then sent to Germany” (R&D manager at 
the Italian subsidiary). 
 
Their strong test results convinced HQ to approve the project. Going even further, the 
subsidiary proactively took the decision to introduce a marsiglia-based variant to fight 
competition from international brands, particularly in softeners, even though it was 
strongly opposed by the parent company.  
It is a huge trend for Italy. Marsiglia is a soap bar, which was used in the 
past, in the 20th century, a soap used by my grandmother. It has a very 
characteristic odour. It is quite well known for being quite effective...It 
is cheap and environmentally friendly...About four to five years ago, we 
saw a trend in the detergents [among local producers] that were using 
this marsiglia soap as a marketing concept. It was an enormous 
success…We were the first to introduce it into dishwashing, then into 
softeners. Can you imagine into the softeners? It took us three to four 
years to convince Germany in this case that marsiglia was an interesting 
trend. (product manager at the Italian subsidiary) 
 
Such experimentation and risk-taking at the subsidiary provided the variety and 
diversity of ideas necessary to develop new business opportunities and then put them 
forward to parent company managers. The subsidiary initiated changes of a strategic 
nature to fight competition. It also enabled HQ to benefit from local experiences. This 
is illustrated by the Italian subsidiary’s experience in physical behaviour of particle 
sizes in dispersion and shared stress, which required trials in a facility that did not 
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exist outside of Italy: “We have this kind of experience and facility here, thus had 
more possibility than colleagues in Germany [HQ] or in Spain and France to perform 
trials. We also have experience in [Y brand] softener, because Lomazzo was one of 
the first plants to produce softeners in the [German MNE] Group…Speaking of 
shared stress in such detail was not usual in our field, but that was what we made use 
of” (R&D manager at the Italian subsidiary). 
 
Passive Agency at the German MNE’s Polish Subsidiary 
In the Polish subsidiary, actors displayed practical-evaluative (i.e. passive) agency. 
This was associated with a misfit between a highly centralized global mode of 
coordination among the CEE operations and a host demand for operational flexibility. 
 By contrast to its Italian counterpart, there was no evidence of the German 
MNE importing product ideas from its Polish subsidiary. Although the MNE had been 
in operation since 1931 in Poland, its historical ties were not as strong as those with, 
for instance, Hungary. The MNE emphasized the exporting of marketing techniques 
and technical tests to Poland. “[A] lot of the marketing mix is developed in the HQ. 
And the countries are responsible for an excellent execution of this initiative” 
(Austrian marketing manager at the Polish subsidiary). “95 per cent of the 
communication is always going through Austria. When Romania wants some 
information from Poland, they are asking us and we are asking Poland” (brand 
manager at CEE HQ). New product development decisions were also taken at HQ.  
A country can come and say it would be interesting to develop for 
example soap paste, which is still in use in countries like Romania. Then 
we get a proposal to develop such a product. But they do not develop it 
in their own country…because you need the background…I know in the 
HQ many persons for 17 years and know where they have started…So 
we [CEE HQ] have the networking advantage owing to the long history. 
(R&D manager at CEE HQ) 
 
As a member of the CEE network, the Polish subsidiary was managed from a more 
centralized global approach whereby decisions were taken by the Austrian HQ. The 
subsidiary did not have any responsibility in new product development or over 
technical modification of existing products for a strategic reorientation. Rather, it 
prepared labels in accordance with the Polish law, registered detergents with the 
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Polish authorities, and performed quality checks on locally-produced goods (R&D 
manager at the Polish subsidiary). According to the HQ, “there is mismanagement in 
the company. The company is not run properly. The investment is not there. State-of-
the-art product cannot be made. There is good technology and highly skilled people 
available, but the whole system is totally bankrupt” (corporate VP manufacturing at 
German MNE). The emphasis at the Polish site was in bringing local practices into 
line with those of the parent company where actors oriented towards the iteration of 
product formulations. 
 
Comparative case discussion: Agency in its link to a fit 
between MNE coordination structure shaped by home country 
institutions and host context demand  
The findings point to a variation in the type of agency displayed across subsidiaries. 
Whether agency is passive or active seems to depend on a fit between MNE 
coordination structure embedded in a particular home institutional setting and host 
country demand.   
As the findings at the British MNE demonstrate, the coordination of 
subsidiaries in an international form, i.e. as appendages to a central domestic 
corporation, encourages the exporting of knowledge. The MNE neither has HQ 
personnel serving its German and Polish subsidiaries, nor provides technical 
international training to its subsidiary members. Rather, it chooses to standardize and 
formalize rules, procedures and policies to co-ordinate and control activities. There is 
a strong separation of strategic and operational management and the exercise of 
control via financial mechanisms (Aguilera and Jackson 2003). Furthermore, the 
deficiency of the compartmentalized national business system in the area of skill 
training as that in the UK (Lane 1996; Whitley 1999) has negative implications for the 
MNE’s long-term growth strategy. Anglo-Saxon managers typically receive education 
in ‘general’ management with a strong emphasis on finance (Aguilera and Jackson 
2003). “The much lesser degree of institutional embeddedness of British firms and 
their only weak exposure to a consistent and widely obligatory system of 
institutionalized rule systems [in comparison to German firms], endows firms with 
greater autonomy but also leaves them far less supported by and implanted in various 
kinds of networks” (Lane 2000a, p. 195). As the mode-of-entry into Germany and 
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Poland indicates, the British MNE chose to limit commitment to and mutual 
dependence on subsidiaries through acquisitions. Its looser inter-firm networks and 
fewer multiplex relationships with capital ties dominated by purely financial interests, 
relative to German firms (Aguilera and Jackson 2003), created room for the Polish 
subsidiary to display strategic orientation. The international coordination structure 
offered a fit with the host country demand for operational flexibility of the Polish 
subsidiary.  
By contrast, a misfit of the German case with the British MNE’s coordination 
structure explains why we found rather passive form of agency, i.e. resistance to 
product ideas developed at the British HQ. The operation’s rich administrative 
heritage has a role to play in its reliance on the past and passive orientation to new 
ideas. The subsidiary is characterized by strongly embedded routines that overlap with 
many other structures that are common in the German institutional context (see Hall 
and Soskice 2001), which inform actors’ orientations. As Howard-Grenville (2005, p. 
633) argues, “if routines are experienced as primarily embedded in cultural structures 
of coordination, orientations toward them might be more iterative, as the enactment of 
these structures tends to draw heavily from the past”. By the same token, Seo and 
Creed (2002) contend that the greater the nonadaptability, or the extent to which 
institutional arrangements are deeply embedded and tightly coupled, the less likely 
will be the reflective shift in collective consciousness. Managers rely on firm-specific 
relationships, i.e. commitments, to exercise control (Aguilera and Jackson 2003). 
Their functional conception of managerial control suggests stronger integration of 
operational functions. A high degree of internal participation tends to foster consensus 
and cooperation in the implementation of decisions (Rogers and Streeck 1994). 
Cooperation that takes place through a variety of mechanisms in Germany, such as 
networks, associations and the state, can be constraining for the adoption of a set of 
practices along an alternative mode (e.g. Streeck, 1997). The multiplex inter-firm 
networks in Germany can act as a restraint on agency in the absence of supportive 
MNE coordination structures.  
Unlike the German MNE, the British MNE does not emphasize social 
integration mechanisms to break institutional logics at its German subsidiary. There is 
inconsistency between the local demands for collaboration and commitment and home 
institutional pressures for standardization and formalization manifested in a 
centralized approach to coordinating MNE activities that encourages passive agency. 
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This contradicts the argument within CIA that discrepancies between institutionalized 
rules and situational demands for resources can create room for actors to engage in 
innovative changes (e.g. Crouch 2005). Although comparative institutional analysts 
(e.g. Streeck and Thelen 2005) and neo-institutionalists (e.g Seo and Creed 2002) 
argue that ambiguity created by diversity in institutional environments can create 
room for strategic responses to institutions, our study indicates that innovative 
capacities can be limited (as in the German subsidiary) by an unsupportive MNE 
coordination structure (such as that of the British MNE).  
In comparison to the British MNE, the coordination structure of the German 
MNE functioned rather differently, having different implications for agency. In the 
Italian case, the German MNE coordinated its operations by emphasizing the 
development of horizontal linkages and subsidiary capabilities through cross-
functional teamwork, training and visits for exchange of experience between HQ and 
local units (R&D Manager at German Chem’s Italian subsidiary). The multiple 
linkages between HQ and overseas subsidiaries enhanced the subsidiary’s ability to 
influence key HQ decisions, particularly in product specifications and design. The 
Euro-team meetings, which served as integrating mechanisms between various 
research teams (cf. Zander and Sölvell 2000), socialized local managers into the 
corporate culture and created a network for the cross-fertilization of ideas between 
subsidiaries and HQ. This is consistent with the characteristic of a collaborative 
national business system where managers adopt a functional conception of managerial 
control (Aguilera and Jackson 2003). This refers to a greater integration of operational 
functions through technical specialization or strong personal involvement than in 
British firms. The company emphasizes the acculturation of its subsidiaries through 
international transfers of managers and international training (Lane 2000b). This is in 
line with the long-termist approach to development that is complemented by a highly 
developed system of vocational education and training in Germany (Ferner et al. 
2001). German MNEs are more likely to send out expatriates to their subsidiaries than 
MNEs from other countries, in particular from the USA and the UK (Harzing 2001). 
The ‘indirect personal form of control’ through an emphasis on strong corporate 
culture (Harzing 1999) at the German MNE is particularly evident in its more 
developed subsidiaries, such as the Italian operation, that participate in the WE 
network of new product development. The ‘direct personal mode of control’ through 
the use of expatriates is more noticeable at the less developed Polish site than at the 
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Italian subsidiary. As the Italian subsidiary demonstrates, the German MNE’s 
institutionally characteristic attempt “to recreate the model which combines a high-
skill work force with a matching organization of technology also in other countries, 
by undertaking a systematic effort to transform the labour force” (Lane 2000a, p. 203) 
through an integrated network of knowledge exchange encourages active agency. 
Actors respond proactively to knowledge diffused by the parent company by revising 
product designs that are directed at the future needs of the organization. In short, the 
more proactive orientation of the Italian site is related to an MNE coordination 
structure that is compatible with host country demands.  
A comparison with the case of the German MNE’s Polish subsidiary illustrates 
that a network structure of coordination did not serve as a medium for active agency, 
as in its Italian counterpart. The CEE network, led by Austria, to which countries such 
as Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia belong, are granted 
less operational flexibility than those of the WE network. One of the reasons for this 
is that the WE network generates about 70 per cent of German MNE’s net sales. This 
gives these subsidiaries the importance of weight: “If I am the bigger country and I 
have a problem with the blue [variant of a product], even if in all other countries the 
blue is an interesting concept but there is a problem conceptually in Italy, then the co-
ordinator, the steerer will say maybe I need to listen to you more than a country that 
weighs five per cent” (product manager at German MNE’s Italian subsidiary). In other 
words, the Polish subsidiary did not have access to resources found in the MNEs 
network structures. Rather, it displayed passive agency associated with a misfit of 
MNE coordination structure with host country context demand. 
The key message of our comparative analysis is clearly demonstrated by the 
two cases that are embedded in the same host country (Poland), which display 
opposite approaches to agency. We observed passive agency at the Polish subsidiary 
of the German MNE, which resulted from the failure of the German MNE’s 
coordination structure to respond to the host demand for operational flexibility. By 
contrast, the Polish subsidiary of the British MNE benefitted from a fit between the 
MNE’s international coordination mode and the host demand for operational 
flexibility. As the development of local competences was not constrained by 
obligational ties to partners or high levels of MNE control (e.g. Otterbeck 1981), as it 
was with the German MNE, the Polish subsidiary of the British MNE could develop 
distinctive capabilities by drawing on its local expertise. Our comparison of the two 
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Polish cases reveals that the strategic approach of the British MNE was more 
supportive of a proactive orientation based on the provision of operational flexibility 
that allowed for local solutions and a local context that supplied knowledge of actors 
to the process. In comparison to the British case, where significant improvements of 
financial performance were sufficient to enhance the subsidiary’s power position, the 
Polish subsidiary of the German MNE retained its position as a ‘peripheral 
participant’ within the MNE’s global network structure. Its functional and operational 
integration within the MNE group, a precondition for developing financial 
performance in diversified quality production-focused German MNEs (e.g. Aguilera 
and Jackson 2003), remained rather weak, discouraging new patterns of thinking 
about business objectives. Thus, our study confirms the contention in CIA that 
“‘innovation’ [taken to mean practices that are unfamiliar in the host context] may be 
easier in less actively regulated business and employment systems” (e.g. Almond et 
al. 2005, p. 281). However, our study goes beyond this to show that the emergence of 
active agency depends on a compatibility between an MNE’s coordination structure 
and the needs and demands of its host country subsidiary. 
   
Conclusion 
In this paper, we contribute to addressing the paradox of embedded agency. A 
significant part of the promise of institutional work (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006) as 
a research area is to establish a broader vision of agency in relation to institutions, one 
that avoids depicting actors as either cultural dopes or hypermuscular institutional 
entrepreneurs. Our aim is to understand the conditions that enable institutionally-
embedded actors to engage in strategic action (in our case, in the area of product 
development) despite institutional pressures towards stasis.  
 Heterogeneity of institutional settings is often assumed to stimulate change.  
Our research does not support this. What it shows, by contrast to key arguments of the 
mainstream CIA literature, is that active agency by subsidiaries corresponds to 
situations where the MNE coordination structures are supportive and correspond to 
the needs and demands of the host country subsidiary. This is not just an ‘institutional 
distance’ argument as is commonly understood in IB. It refers to whether local 
institutions support the subsidiary to take advantage of specific opportunities 
conditioned by the home country institutions. This is based on the conceptualization 
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of institutions as distinct national constellations, drawn from CIA, to understand how 
and why different institutions impact firm behaviour. Hence, our findings point to the 
need to revisit the conceptualization of ‘institutional distance’ in IB to consider which 
institutions matter in what ways.  
 Accordingly, our case discussion has shown that, at the British MNE, while 
decision structures were more formal and centralized, subsidiaries had fairly 
substantial operational flexibility to make decisions in their daily business. This 
stimulated active agency in the Polish subsidiary, which, because of the legacy of 
state control was both accustomed to centralized coordination and keen to generate 
the much needed innovation. However, the German subsidiary, embedded in its own 
national industry networks, struggled with centralized coordination based in the UK 
and displayed only passive agency. At the German MNE, the emphasis on integrated 
network coordination and a strong corporate culture inspired active agency in its 
Italian subsidiary, which also had a strong tradition of innovation and collaboration 
within its local networks. By contrast, the Polish subsidiary remained on the periphery 
of the core collaborative MNE network that made key decisions and distributed 
resources for innovation, and displayed passive agency. 
 The findings have implications for both parent company and subsidiary 
managers. For the former, they point to the importance of aligning coordination 
structures with host context requirements to facilitate innovative changes. For the 
latter, the results highlight the significance of striving for ‘optimal distinctiveness’ 
(Alvarez et al. 2005), i.e. for a balance between seeking legitimacy and maintaining 
unique identity to differentiate oneself.  
Additional research could contribute further to studies on agency within the 
MNE by shedding light on how agency at the individual level can influence national-
level institutions. Most studies to date have focused on the organizational level of 
analysis, neglecting the orientations, motivations and impact of individual actors 
(Reay et al. 2006). At the same time, as action is embedded in organizations which 
are, in turn, shaped by institutions, it is critical that we address both organizational 
and institutional levels of analysis to facilitate a more comprehensive understanding 
of agency. Such multilevel research has been suggested as a promising avenue of 
research within the framework of institutional theory (Friedland and Alford 1991; 
Reay et al. 2006).  
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Endnotes 
1. Hollingsworth (2003, p. 132) recognizes that institutional analysis occurs at multiple levels. 
At the first level, there are the basic norms and rules of a society. On the next level of analysis, 
there are institutional arrangements that coordinate various economic actors. These consist of 
markets, associations, communities and clans. The next level consists of the institutional 
sectors. The norms and rules of a society influence the array of institutional arrangements, and 
both of these influence the nature of, and the relationship among, various institutional sectors 
that include a society’s distinct system of education, legal system, business system and 
financial system. We focus here on transformation of institutional arrangements. 
2. Although Oliver (1991) represents the first systematic attempt at articulating the range of 
potential responses available to organizations facing institutional pressures, her view reflects a 
unidimensional understanding of agency. A problem with such a view is that it does not 
clearly specify the extent to which actors can affect the social world for them to be regarded as 
having a high versus a low level of agency (Battilana and D’Aunno 2009). We adopt here the 
multidimensional view, following Emirbayer and Mische (1998), where actors’ engagement 
with the social world can both reproduce and transform an environment’s structures. We 
conceptualize agency as a temporally embedded process of social engagement, informed by 
the past (in its habitual aspect), but also oriented towards the future (as a capacity to imagine 
alternative possibilities) and towards the present (as a capacity to respond to the demands of 
the present) (Battilana and D’Aunno 2009).  
3. A condition is necessary for a given outcome if it is always present when the outcome occurs, 
i.e. when the outcome cannot occur in its absence (George and Bennett 2005; Rihoux and 
Ragin 2009). Consequently, an unnecessary condition is that which is always absent when the 
outcome occurs. Charles Ragin (1987) has coined this term to distinguish between conditions 
that are associated with the outcome and those that are not related to the outcome. This is 
further exemplified by Rohwer (2011) where the method is argued to trim components that are 
logically unnecessary for the presence of the outcome in one or more case(s).  
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Appendix:   Illustrative list of codes associated with agency 
 
Categories 
related to the 
agency outcome 
Sub-categories British MNE German MNE 
Knowledge 
transfer (i.e. the 
direction in which 
product ideas and 
process know-how 
flow) 
Exporting/ 
Importing of 
knowledge 
“Knowledge is developed at the centre and exported to 
overseas units” 
“With the [X brand], what we did is that we exported it 
from the UK. So they [the German subsidiary] took the 
same range as the UK, and then gradually over a period 
of time, we formulated a match using their raw materials”  
“All recipes are owned, in fact, by the UK. So if we [the 
Polish subsidiary] want to make changes to the recipes, 
those need to be approved by the UK. There are people 
from the UK labs who come here and advise”. 
“Marketing units operate in Euro team [which consist of a strategic 
business unit member from the headquarters and marketing 
managers across Europe. The Euro team notion is quite important. 
They aid in forging interdependency among [Western European] 
subsidiaries to stimulate new product development”.  
“A country can come and say it would be interesting to develop for 
example soap paste, which is still in use in countries like Romania. 
Then we [HQ] get a proposal to develop such a product. But they 
[CEE subsidiaries] do not develop it in their own country”.  
 
Categories 
related to the 
agency outcome 
Sub-categories German subsidiary of British 
MNE 
Polish subsidiary of 
British MNE 
Italian subsidiary of German 
MNE 
Polish subsidiary of German 
MNE 
Mode of control 
(i.e. the extent to 
which decision 
making is 
centralized, 
standardized and 
formalized) 
Direct/indirect-
personal/impersona
l nature of control 
“We do have a discipline, template, an operating 
framework that says what is decided where, which 
decisions are to be taken locally, regionally, 
internationally, and what things you need to tell people”. 
“We are much better organized in terms of having 
country managers and functional structures, which are 
much more European-based. So in terms of R&D, 
although we have some labs such as that in France and in 
Poland, our activities are all pretty well managed in terms 
of knowing what is going on and who is doing what”. 
 “You [HQ] invest in a lot of 
infrastructure, not only 
machinery and equipment, but 
you build up very much in 
people, education, training”.  
“We [HQ] are sending people to 
Germany in the form of job 
rotation…It may be short period 
for training purposes and visits 
for exchange of experience 
between headquarters and local 
units”. 
 “A lot of the marketing mix is 
developed in the [CEE] 
headquarters. And the countries 
are responsible for excellent 
execution of this initiative”.  
“95 per cent of the 
communication is always going 
through Austria. When Romania 
wants some information from 
Poland, they are asking us and 
we are asking Poland”. 
Subsidiary 
capability (i.e. the 
interest in and 
Extensive/ limited 
emphasis on 
experimentation 
“Four years ago, when I 
discussed this with 
Germany and the UK, they 
“About four years ago, we 
were looking at different 
products to launch which 
“About four to five years ago, 
we [the Italian subsidiary] saw a 
trend in the detergents that were 
“We [CEE HQ in Austria] 
together with the German Chem 
HQ develop a formula on paper, 
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ability to improve 
products and 
processes) 
[Germany] asked ‘why do 
you want to launch this 
when other paints cover 
well, better than those of 
the competitors?’”  
would be innovative, 
different and better than 
what the competition has 
got. There were no 
products…the market at 
that point in time seemed 
to be following the way of 
developing tinting 
business…Looking at the 
UK market, there were 
suggestions that launching 
colours would not be a bad 
idea, because it works in 
the UK. However, we are 
afraid of advices of doing 
something because it 
works in the UK. So we 
did not really know which 
would be the preferred 
route”. 
using this marsiglia soap as a 
marketing concept. It was an 
enormous success…We were the 
first to introduce it into 
dishwashing, then into 
softeners… In the beginning the 
test results were not enough to 
sell to the top management that 
it was a good process, but then 
they realized that it was 
possible”.   
then we make a production trial 
in the CEE country where we 
want to produce this formula. 
The local R&D controls the 
production trial and makes all 
specification parameters, tests 
on density, solubility, the rinsing 
behaviour”. 
“There is mismanagement in the 
company. The company is not 
run properly…State-of-the-art 
product cannot be made. There 
is good technology and highly-
skilled people available, but the 
whole system is totally 
bankrupt”.  
 
 30  
References 
Aguilera, R. V., & Jackson, G. (2003). The cross-national diversity of corporate governance: 
Dimensions and determinants. Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 447-465. 
 
Almond, P., Edwards, T., Colling, T., Ferner, A., Gunnigle, P., Muller, M., Quintanilla, J., & Waechter, 
H. (2005). Unravelling Home and Host Country Effects: An Investigation of the HR Policies of an 
American Multinational in Four European Countries. Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy 
and Society (Berkeley), 44(2), 276-306. 
 
Alvarez, J. L. Mazza, C., Pedersen, J. S., & Svejenova, S. (2005). Shielding idiosyncracy from 
isomorphic pressures: Towards optimal distinctiveness in European filmmaking. Organization, 
12(6), 863-888. 
 
Bartlett, C., & Ghoshal, S. (1989). Managing across borders: The transnational solution. Boston, 
Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Battilana, J., & D’Aunno, T. (2009). Institutional work and the paradox of embedded agency, In T. 
Lawrence, et al. (Eds.), Institutional Work: Actors and Agency in Institutional Studies of 
Organizations (pp. 31-58).Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Börsch, A. (2007). Global pressure, national system: How German corporate governance is changing. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.  
Brouthers, K. D. (2002). Institutional, cultural and transaction cost influences on entry mode choice 
and performance. Journal of International Business Studies, 33(2), 203-221. 
Buckley, J. ,& Casson, M. C. (1976). The future of the multinational enterprise. London: Macmillan.  
Bruton, G. D., & Ahlstrom, D. (2003). An institutional view of China’s venture capital industry: 
Explaining the differences between China and the West. Journal of Business Venturing, 18(2), 
233-259. 
Clark, E., & Geppert, M. (2006). Socio-political processes in international management in post-
socialist contexts: Knowledge, learning and transnational institution building. Journal of 
International Management, 12(3), 340-357. 
 
Crouch, C. (2005). Capitalist diversity and change. Recombinant governance and institutional 
entrepreneurs. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Cuervo-Cazurra, A., & Genc, M. (2008). Transforming disadvantages into advantages: Developing 
country MNEs in the least developed countries. Journal of International Business Studies, 39(6), 
957-979. 
 
Czaban, L., Hocevar, M., Jaklic, M., & Whitley R. (2003). Path dependence and contractual relations in 
emergent capitalism: Contrasting state socialist legacies and inter-firm cooperation in Hungary 
and Slovenia. Organization Studies, 24(1), 7-28. 
 
Dacin, M. T., Goodstein, J., & Scott, W. (2002). Institutional theory and institutional change: 
Introduction to the special research forum. Academy of Management Journal, 45(1), 45-57.  
 
Delios, A., & Beamish, P. W. (1999). Ownership strategy of Japanese firms: Transaction, institutional 
and experience influences. Strategic Management Journal, 20(10), 915-933.  
 
Delios, A., & Henisz, W. J. (2000). Japanese firms’ investment strategies in emerging economies. 
Academy of Management Journal, 43(3), 305-323. 
Dikova, D., & Van Witteloostuijn, A. (2007). Foreign direct investment mode choice: Entry and 
establishment modes in transition economies. Journal of International Business Studies, 38(6), 
1013-1033.  
 31  
 
Djelic, M.-L., & Quack, S. (2003). Governing globalization—bringing institutions back in. In M.-L. 
Djelic & S. Quack (Eds.), Globalization and institutions: Redefining the rules of the economic 
game (pp. 1-14). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Dorado, S. (2005). Institutional entrepreneurship, partaking, and convening. Organization Studies, 
26(3), 385-414. 
 
Edwards, T., & Ferner, A. (2002). The renewed ‘American challenge’: A review of employment 
practice in US multinationals. Industrial Relations Journal, 33(2), 94–111.  
Emirbayer, M., & Mische, A. (1998). What is agency? American Journal of Sociology, 103(4), 962-
1023.  
 
Ferner, A., Quintanilla, J., & Varul, M. Z. (2001). Country-of-origin effects, host-country effects, and 
the management of human resources in multinationals: German companies in Britain and Spain. 
Journal of World Business, 36(2), 107-127. 
 
Friedland, R., & Alford, R. R. (1991). Bringing society back in: Symbols, practice, and institutional 
contradictions. In W. Powell & P. DiMaggio (Eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational 
Analysis (,pp. 232-263). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
George, A. L. & Bennett, A. (2005). Case studies and theory development in the social science. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.  
 
Geppert, M., Williams, K., & Matten, D. (2003): The social construction of contextual rationalities in 
MNCs: An Anglo-German comparison of subsidiary choice. Journal of Management Studies, 
40(3), 617-641. 
 
Ghemawat, P. (2001). Distance still matters: The hard reality of global expansion. Harvard Business 
Review, 79(8), 137-147.  
 
Greenwood, R., Suddaby, R., & Hinings, C. R. (2002). Theorizing change: The role of professional 
associations in the transformation of institutional fields. Academy of Management Journal, 45(1), 
58-80.   
 
Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D. (2001). Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative 
advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hall, P. A., & Thelen, K. (2009). Institutional change in varieties of capitalism. Socio-Economic 
Review, 7(1), 7-34.  
 
Hancké, B., & Goyer, M. (2005). Degree of freedom: Rethinking the institutional analysis of economic 
change. In G. Morgan, R. Whitley & E. Moen (Eds.), Changing capitalisms? Institutional change 
and systems of economic organization (pp. 53-77). Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Hardy, C., & Maguire, S. (2008). Institutional entrepreneurship. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin, 
& R. Suddaby (Eds.), Organizational Institutionalism (pp. 198-217). London: Sage.  
 
Harzing, A.-W. (1999). Managing the multinationals: An international study of control mechanisms. : 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Harzing, A.-W. (2001). An analysis of the functions of international transfer of managers in MNCs. 
Employee Relations, 23(6), 581-598.  
 
Henisz, W. J., & Delios, A. (2001). Uncertainty, imitation, and plant location: Japanese multinational 
corporations, 1990-1996. Administrative Science Quarterly, 46(3), 443-475. 
 32  
Henisz, W. J., & Zelner, B. A. (2005). Legitimacy, interest group pressures and change in emergent 
institutions: The case of foreign investors and host country governments. Academy of 
Management Review, 30(2), 361-382. 
Hill, C. W. L., Hwang, P., & Kim, W. C. (1990). An eclectic theory of the choice of international 
market entry mode. Strategic Management Journal, 9(Summer Special Issue), 93-104. 
 
Hollingsworth, J. R. (2003). Advancing the socio-economic paradigm with institutional analysis. Socio-
Economic Review, 1(1), 130-134. 
 
Howard-Grenville, J. A (2005). The persistence of flexible organizational routines: The Role of agency 
and organizational context. Organization Science, 16(6), 618-636.  
 
Jackson, G. (2005). Contested boundaries: Ambiguity and creativity in the evolution of German 
codetermination. In W. Streeck & K. Thelen (Eds.), Beyond continuity: Explorations in the 
dynamics of advanced political economies (pp. 229-254). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Jackson, G., & Deeg, R. (2008). Comparing capitalisms: Understanding institutional diversity and its 
implications for international business. Journal of International Business Studies, 39(4), 540-561. 
 
Kostova, T., Kendall, R., & Dacin, M. T. (2008). Institutional theory in the study of multinational 
corporations: A critique and new directions. Academy of Management Review, 33(4), 994-1006.  
 
Lane, C. (1996). The social constitution of supplier relations in Britain and Germany: An 
institutionalist analysis. In R. Whitley & P. H. Kristensen (Eds.), The changing European firm: 
limits to convergence (pp. 271-304). London: Routledge. 
 
Lane, C. (2000a). Understanding the globalization strategies of German and British multinational 
companies: Is a ‘societal effects’ approach still useful? In M. Maurice & A. Sorge (Eds.), 
Embedding organizations (pp. 271-304). Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
 
Lane, C. (2000b). Globalization and the German model of capitalism—erosion or survival? British 
Journal of Sociology, 51(2), 207-234. 
 
Lawrence, T. B., & Suddaby, R. (2006). Institutions and institutional work. In S. R. Clegg, et al. (Eds.), 
Handbook of organization studies (pp. 215-254). London: Sage.   
Lee, C., & Beamish, P. W. (1995). The characteristics and performance of Korean joint ventures in 
LDCs. Journal of International Business Studies, 26(3), 637-654.  
Meardi, G., Marginson, P., Fichter, M., Frybes, M., Stanojevic, M., & A. Toth (2009). Varieties of 
capitalism: Adapting employment practices in Central Eastern Europe. Industrial Relations, 48(3), 
489-511. 
 
Meyer, K. E. (2001). Institutions, transaction costs, and entry mode choice in Eastern Europe. Journal 
of International Business Studies, 32(2), 357-367. 
 
Meyer, K. E., & Nguyen, H. V. (2005). Foreign investment strategies and sub-national institutions in 
emerging markets: Evidence from Vietnam. Journal of Management Studies, 42(1), 63-93. 
 
Meyer, K. E., Estrin, S., Bhaumik, S. K., & Peng, M. W. (2009). Institutions, resources, and entry 
strategies in emerging economies. Strategic Management Journal, 30(1), 61-80. 
 
Mill, J. S. (1974). A system of logic ratiocinative and inductive: Being a connected view of the 
principles of evidence and the methods of scientific investigation. Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press. 
 
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.   
 
 33  
Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic responses to institutional processes. Academy of Management Review, 
16(1), 145-179.  
Otterbeck, L. (1981). The management of headquarters-subsidiary relations in multinational 
corporations. Hampshire: Gower Publishing.  
 
Peng, M. W. (2001). The resource-based view and international business. Journal of Management, 
27(6), 803-829. 
 
Peng, M. W. (2002). Towards an institution-based view of business strategy. Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management, 19(2/3), 251-267. 
 
Peng, M. W. (2003). Institutional transitions and strategic choices. Academy of Management Review, 
28(2), 275-296. 
 
Peng, M. W. (2008). Global business. Cincinnati: South-Western College Publishing. 
 
Peng, M. W., Sun, S. L., Pinkham, B., & Chen, H. (2009). The institution-based view as a third leg for 
a strategy tripod. Academy of Management Perspectives, 23(3), 63-81. 
 
Ragin, C. C. (1987). The comparative method: Moving beyond qualitative and quantitative Methods. 
Berkeley: University of California. 
 
Reay, T., Golden-Biddle, K., & Germann, K. (2006). Legitimizing a new role: Small wins and 
microprocesses of change. Academy of Management Journal, 49(4), 977-998. 
 
Redding, G. (2005). The thick description and comparison of societal systems of capitalism. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 36(2), 123-155. 
 
Rihoux, B., & Ragin, C. C. (2009). Configurational comparative Methods: Qualitative comparative 
analysis (QCA) and related techniques. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
 
Rohwer, G. (2011). ‘Qualitative comparative analysis: A discussion of interpretations’, European 
Sociological Review, forthcoming, doi: 10.1093/esr/jcq034. 
 
Rogers, J., & Streeck, W. (1994). Workplace representation overseas: The works council story”. In R. 
Freeman (Ed.), Working under Different Rules (pp. 97-156). New York: Sage.  
 
Sadler-Smith, E., Spicer, D. P., & Chaston, I. (2001). Learning orientations and growth in smaller 
firms. Long Range Planning, 34(2), 139-158.   
 
Saka, A. (2004). Cross-national diffusion of work systems: Translation of Japanese operations in the 
UK. Organization Studies, 25(2), 209-228. 
 
Seo, M.-G., & Creed, W. (2002). Institutional contradictions, praxis, and institutional change: A 
dialectical perspective. Academy of Management Review, 27(2), 222-247.  
 
Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1998). Basics of qualitative research: techniques and procedures for 
developing grounded theory. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.  
 
Streeck, W. (1992). Social institutions and economic performance: Studies of industrial relations in 
advanced capitalist economies. London: Sage.  
 
Streeck, W. (1997). Beneficial constraints: On the economic limits of rational voluntarism, In J. R. 
Hollingsworth & R. Boyer (Eds.), Contemporary capitalism: The embeddedness of institutions 
(pp.197-219). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Streeck, W., & Thelen, K. (2005). Beyond continuity: Explorations in the dynamics of advanced 
political economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
 34  
Treviňo, L., & Mixon, F. (2004). Strategic factors affecting foreign direct investment decisions by 
multinational enterprises in Latin America, Journal of World Business, 39(3), 233-243. 
 
Wever, K. S. (1995). Negotiating competitiveness: Employment relations and organisational 
innovation in Germany and the United States. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Business 
School Press.  
Whitley, R. (1999). Divergent capitalisms: The social structuring and change of business systems. 
Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
 
Whitley, R. (2007). Business systems and organizational capabilities: The institutional structuring of 
competitive competences. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Williams, K., & Geppert, M. (2011). Bargained globalization: employment relations providing robust 
“tool kits” for socio-political strategizing in MNCs in Germany. In C. Dörrenbächer & M. 
Geppert (Eds.), Politics and power in the multinational corporation: The role of interests, 
identities, and institution (pp. 72-100). Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Zander, I., & Sölvell, Ö. (2000). Cross-border innovation in the multinational corporation: A research 
agenda. International Studies of Management and Organization, 30(1), 44-67. 
 
Zhao, M. (2006). Conducting R&D in countries with weak intellectual property rights protection. 
Management Science, 52(8), 1185-1199. 
 
 
 35  
Table 1: Case selection 
 
 
Cases British MNE-German 
Sub 
British MNE-Polish Sub German MNE-Italian 
Sub 
German MNE-Polish Sub 
MNE coordination 
structure 
International mode International mode Integrated network form Highly centralized global 
mode 
Host context demand Demand for collaboration Demand for operational 
flexibility 
Demand for collaboration Demand for operational 
flexibility 
Fit between MNE 
coordination structure 
and host context 
Misfit between 
international mode and 
demand for collaboration 
Fit between international 
mode & demand for 
operational flexibility 
Fit between integrated 
network mode & demand 
for collaboration 
Misfit between highly 
centralized global mode 
and demand for operational 
flexibility 
 36  
Table 2: Types of agency at subsidiaries 
 
Bundles of conditions British MNE’s 
German Sub 
British MNE’s Polish Sub German MNE’s Italian Sub  German MNE’s Polish Sub 
MNE coordination 
structure 
International mode International mode   Integrated network mode  Highly centralized global mode  
Host context demand Demand for 
collaboration 
Demand for operational 
flexibility 
Demand for collaboration Demand for operational flexibility 
Fit between MNE 
coordination structure 
and host context demand 
Misfit between 
international mode of 
coordination and 
demand for 
collaboration 
Fit between international 
mode of coordination and 
demand for operational 
flexibility 
Fit between integrated network 
mode of coordination and demand 
for collaboration 
Misfit between highly centralized 
global mode of coordination and 
demand for operational flexibility 
Knowledge transfer Parent to sub Sub to parent Parent to sub 
Focus of subsidiary 
capability building 
Emphasis on 
interdepartmental 
interdependency rather 
than an entrepreneurial 
style 
High emphasis on 
experimentation despite a 
small and low technically- 
equipped R&D lab 
Respected member of the Western 
European network with emphasis 
on experimentation 
Member of the Eastern European 
network with low autonomy to 
experiment  
Mode of entry into host 
country 
Acquisition (1998) Acquisition (1996) Greenfield (1935) Joint venture in 1931, full 
ownership in 1992 
Mode of control Direct, impersonal: Standardized and formalized new 
product development procedures 
 
Indirect, personal:  
Emphasis on strong ‘corporate 
culture’, acculturating subsidiaries 
through international management 
training and secondment 
Direct, personal:  
centralized control whereby 
decisions are taken by the 
Austrian HQ 
Type of agency Passive: iterative 
agency (resistance to 
product ideas) 
 
Active: projective agency 
(change in industry trend 
with the launch of colours) 
Active: projective agency (industry 
trend setting by launching 
marsiglia-based products that were 
initially resisted by the parent) 
Passive: Practical-evaluative 
agency (registering and labelling 
detergents with the Polish 
authorities, and performing 
quality checks on local products) 
 
 
